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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Is the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act applicable to the
releases of hazardous substances at 123 Laurel
Street, considering issues of (a) retroactivity
and (b) federal Commerce Clause jurisdiction?
2. Does § 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
provide for liability (a) for medical monitoring
costs and (b) to a potentially responsible
party?
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OPINION BELOW
The opinion and judgment of the United States District
Court for the District of New Union (Civ. No. 94-22,046), de-
cided April 23, 1996, is unreported.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
INVOLVED
The constitutional provisions involved are U.S. Const.
art I, § 8, cl. 3, and U.S. Const. amend. XI. Both provisions
can be found at appendix Al. The statutory provisions in-
volved are:
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988); 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1-4) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988); 42
U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)-(3) (1988). They are also included in the
appendix.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Greater Uniontown Vocational School ("GUVS") was in-
corporated in 1963. (R. at 3). From 1963 to 1973, GUVS op-
erated out of a building at 123 Laurel Street in Uniontown,
New Union. (R. at 4). Although it was created by the state
legislature, GUVS is governed by a Board of Directors re-
sponsible for its own selection and replacement and for its by-
laws and all other matters of governance, subject only to the
same laws applicable to other non-profit corporations incorpo-
rated in New Union. (R. at 4). A 1964 opinion of the New
Union Attorney General concluded that "GUVS is not an in-
strumentality of New Union state government." (R. at 4).
Among the programs GUVS offered while at 123 Laurel
Street was photography. (R. at 4). GUVS procured all of its
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/14
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photography supplies from New Union Industrial Supply
Corp., a shipper and wholesaler. (R. at 4-5). New Union In-
dustrial Supply Corp. formulated the chemicals and manu-
factured the equipment used in the program from raw
materials drawn from a nationwide market. (R. at 5). The
same finished chemicals and equipment were available from
any of a large number of suppliers throughout the country.
(R. at 5).
Throughout its ownership of 123 Laurel Street, GUVS
dumped waste photo processing chemicals into a ditch in the
backyard. (R. at 5). In 1973, GUVS sold its real property at
123 Laurel Street to Start-Up Photography Studios ("SUPS").
(R. at 5). SUPS continued the waste disposal practices of
GUVS until going bankrupt in 1979. (R. at 5). The property
was purchased in the bankruptcy proceedings by While-U-
Wait Photo Service ("WUWPS") in September 1980. (R. at 5).
WUWPS is a film processing service owned and operated by
Elizabeth Andrews. (R. at 5).
Although Ms. Andrews did not dispose of her waste photo
processing chemicals in the backyard, she knew that GUVS
and SUPS had done so. (R. at 6). However, she neglected to
raise the issue when she purchased the property. (R. at 6).
The sales contracts and deeds transferring the property from
GUVS to SUPS, and subsequently to WUWPS, are silent as
to both hazardous waste liability and the general issue of lia-
bility from the ownership of the property. (R. at 6).
In 1993, the owners of the house next door, the Marina
family, complained of a strange "camera-type" odor emanat-
ing from their private drinking water well. (R. at 6). Testing
revealed elevated levels of photo processing chemicals in the
drinking water. (R. at 6). After investigating the site and
sampling the soil, an environmental engineering firm con-
cluded that (1) the source of the chemicals in the Marina's
water was the ditch in the backyard of 123 Laurel Street, (2)
the geohydrology is such that the contamination could only
have reached the Marina's property and no other, and (3)
there is no longer a threat to anyone's health or the environ-
ment. (R. at 6). Both the water testing and the engineering
1997] 919
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firm's work were conducted consistent with the National Con-
tingency Plan at 40 C.F.R. § 300. (R. at 6).
Only GUVS and SUPS ever disposed of chemicals on the
property at 123 Laurel Street. (R. at 5). Both had disposed of
the same kinds of chemicals, but there are no records indicat-
ing how much waste either contributed. (R. at 6).
The Marina family is comprised of two parents and five
minor children. (R. at 6). They do not have health insurance
and, with the Marina parents working at minimum wage
jobs, they have virtually no money for health care. (R. at 6).
In 1994, the Marinas were examined by a physician of the
State of New Union Health Services Agency ("SNUHSA").
(R. at 6). Based on the physician's examination, the engi-
neering firm's report, and other facts in the case, SNUHSA
began a protocol of medical monitoring for the Marinas in
September 1994. (R. at 7). The monitoring involves examin-
ing each member of the family every calendar quarter for
signs of adverse affects from having consumed the contami-
nated water. (R. at 7). The cost of the examination and the
associated laboratory tests is $250 per person per quarter.
(R. at 7). SNUHSA has found it will be necessary to continue
the medical monitoring protocol through December 2000. (R.
at 7). SNUHSA's actions are consistent with the National
Contingency Plan at 40 C.F.R. § 300. (R. at 7). To date, there
has been no involvement at this site by the United States En-
vironmental Protection Agency. (R. at 7).
SNUHSA commenced an action against both WUWPS
and GUVS under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), seek-
ing compensation for its medical monitoring costs. (R. at 7).
At the same time, WUWPS commenced an action against
GUVS under CERCLA, asserting that GUYVS is liable to
WUWPS for the costs of the water testing, site investigation,
and soil removal. (R. at 7). The district court held that CER-
CLA is applicable to this case, that medical monitoring costs
are recoverable by SNUHSA from both WUWPS and GUVS,
and that WUWPS may proceed under CERCLA § 107. (Tr. at
9). The two cases have been consolidated with the consent of
the parties. (R. at 7).
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues raised on appeal are questions of law and not
fact; therefore, a de novo standard of review applies. United
States v. ILCO, Inc., 996 F.2d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir. 1993).
Specifically, the standard of review for a district court's con-
struction of a federal statute is a question of law to be re-
viewed de novo. Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1539 (10th
Cir. 1991).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
CERCLA was enacted by Congress in 1980 to deal with
the problem of existing hazardous waste sites. Because the
problem of hazardous waste is one that is national in scope,
and it stems from both intrastate and interstate activities,
Congress was within its Commerce Clause authority when it
enacted CERCLA. CERCLA is applicable to GUVS, which
has acted as a member of the film developing industry-the
market for hazardous photo processing chemicals. Further-
more, GUVS is not entitled to sovereign immunity because it
is not a state agency. Even if it were a state agency, GUVS
would not be immune from the suit brought by SNUHSA, an-
other state agency.
CERCLA does not act retroactively when applied to 123
Laurel Street because the release of hazardous waste, as well
as all costs incurred, occurred after CERCLA was enacted.
Even if the application of CERCLA to this site were retroac-
tive, such a retroactive application would be constitutionally
permissible. A statute can apply retroactively where there is
evidence of a clear congressional intent that it do so, and the
text and legislative history of CERCLA evidence such intent.
Therefore, CERCLA is applicable to GUVS
CERCLA allows States to recover for all removal and re-
medial costs. Furthermore, several federal district courts
have held that medical monitoring costs are recoverable
under CERCLA's definitions of "removal" and "remedial"
costs. Those federal courts that have found that CERCLA
does not create liability for medical monitoring expenses
1997] 921
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based their analysis on a single, erroneous district court's
reasoning.
Finally, PRPs are not allowed to recover their expenses
under CERCLA 107, but, rather, are limited to utilizing CER-
CLA 113's contribution provisions. CERCLA 113 was en-
acted to create an express right to contribution, and current
case law demonstrates a trend among the federal courts rec-
ognizing that PRPs are limited to seeking contribution under
CERCLA 113.
ARGUMENT
REPLY POINT 1: THE DISTRICT COURT WAS
CORRECT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING
THAT THE APPLICATION OF CERCLA TO THIS
SITE IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
A. The Application of CERCLA to this Site Does Not
Exceed Congress' Commerce Clause Authority.
1. Article I of the United States Constitution gives
Congress the power to regulate interstate
commerce.
The United States Constitution specifically grants Con-
gress the power to regulate interstate commerce. U.S. Const.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (Appendix Al). The Supreme Court has in-
terpreted the Commerce Clause to give Congress broad regu-
latory powers. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1, 195 (1824).
Gibbons held that the commerce power allows Congress to
regulate interstate activities and "those internal concerns
which affect the states generally." Id. The Court further held
that commerce included all "commercial intercourse." Id. at
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/14
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2. The regulation of hazardous waste disposal is
within Congress' Commerce Clause authority.
a. Under Supreme Court Commerce Clause
analysis, Congress may regulate intrastate
activities having a substantial affect on
interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court first held that Congress could regu-
late intrastate activities having a substantial impact on in-
terstate commerce in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937). The Court soon thereafter dispensed with
distinctions between commerce and other forms of economic
activity, and between direct and indirect effects on interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25
(1942) ("Whether the subject of the regulation in question
was 'production,' 'consumption,' or 'marketing' is, therefore,
not material for purposes of deciding the question of federal
power before us"; Congress may regulate an intrastate activ-
ity having a substantial effect on interstate commerce, "irre-
spective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier
time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect'). The Court
also established a rational basis standard of review that re-
quires federal courts to defer in most instances to Congress'
judgment as to whether an intrastate activity substantially
affects interstate commerce. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276, 281
(1981) (upholding the Surface Mining Control and Reclama-
tion Act despite claims that it intruded on local land use au-
thority); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-56 (1971)
(upholding a conviction for loansharking under the Consumer
Credit Protection Act even though the extortionate credit
transaction was entirely intrastate).
The Supreme Court did not repudiate any of its post-
1937 decisions when it struck down a federal criminal statute
barring firearms on or near schools as violative of the Com-
merce Clause in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995). Lopez cited and discussed the post-1937 case law
with approval, reaffirming the Court's holdings in cases
where the intrastate activity's relation to interstate com-
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merce had been quite modest. Wickard, for example, rejected
a Commerce Clause challenge to a federal statute that regu-
lated the amount of wheat one could raise, even for home con-
sumption. While the wheat grown and consumed on Mr.
Filburn's 23-acre farm might have had only a trivial effect on
interstate commerce, the Court held "it is not enough to re-
move him from the scope of federal regulation where ... his
contribution, taken together with that of many others simi-
larly situated, is far from trivial." 317 U.S. at 127-28. As one
of many film developers using identical photo processing
chemicals throughout the country, GUVS may likewise be
regulated under the Commerce Clause, as discussed further
in part 2(B) below.
The Supreme Court found Lopez distinguishable from
Wickard and other post-1937 cases on two grounds: (1) the
firearm statute did not involve "commerce" or any sort of eco-
nomic enterprise; and (2) it intruded into traditional pre-
serves of state authority, thereby undermining state
autonomy. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31. CERCLA does not
suffer from these shortcomings because (1) hazardous waste
disposal does involve commerce, and (2) the regulation of haz-
ardous waste disposal does not intrude into a traditional pre-
serve of state authority.
b. Hazardous waste disposal is an intrastate
activity having a substantial aggregate affect
on interstate commerce.
Like the statutes upheld in Wickard and Perez, CERCLA
regulates activities that arise out of and are connected with a
commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce. Hazardous wastes typ-
ically are generated by out-of-state firms or are byproducts of
consumer or industrial goods that move in interstate com-
merce. See John P. Dwyer, The Commerce Clause and the
Limits of Congressional Authority to Regulate the Environ-
ment, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 10421 (1995). Although CERCLA
does not contain legislative findings, Congress stated that
"problems of waste disposal .. . have become a matter na-
tional in scope" in its congressional finding for the Resource
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Conservation and Recovery Act. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4)
(1988). Hazardous photo processing chemicals contribute to
that national problem.
In this case, GUVS is one member of a class of activities
having a substantial aggregate affect on interstate. During
its operations at 123 Laurel Street, GUVS engaged in film
processing. (R. at 4-5). The photo processing chemicals and
equipment GUVS used were of a kind available from many
suppliers throughout the country. (R. at 5). Moreover, the
specific chemicals and equipment GUVS purchased from New
Union Industrial Supply Corp. were formulated and manu-
factured from raw materials drawn from a nationwide mar-
ket. (R. at 5). Thus, as a film developer, GUVS was part of
the national market for photo processing chemicals and
equipment, a market within the reach of federal Commerce
Clause power. Where the class of activities regulated is
within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power
"to excise, as trivial, individual instances" of the class. Mary-
land v. Wirtz, 329 U.S. 183, 193 (1968).
c. Hazardous waste disposal regulation does not
intrude into a traditional preserve of state
authority
The argument that federal environmental statutes inter-
fere with the State's role in regulating land use was raised
and rejected in Hodel. In that case, a coal operator trade as-
sociation claimed that the Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act violated the Commerce Clause because it
regulated private, intrastate land use activities. In rejecting
the argument, the Court made two observations concerning
the validity of the federal regulation as it affected land use.
First, the statute was held constitutional because Congress
wanted to protect the states from competing with each other
for industry by relaxing environmental controls. "The pre-
vention of this sort of destructive interstate competition is a
traditional role for congressional action under the Commerce
Clause." Hodel, 452 U.S. at 282 (citing United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941). Second, the Court held "the
power conferred by the Commerce Clause [is] broad enough
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to permit congressional regulation of activities causing air or
water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may
have effects in more than one State." Id. at 282. The Court
will uphold federal environmental statutes as long as the con-
gressional scheme is "reasonably related to the goals Con-
gress sought to accomplish." Id. at 283. In this case,
regulation of the disposal of hazardous wastes, such as photo
processing chemicals, is reasonably related to preventing
water and soil contamination. Given that Lopez cited Hodel
with approval and adhered to the "cumulative effects" test for
intrastate activities, GUVS's contention that it may not be
reached under CERCLA since Lopez is incorrect.
B. The Application of CERCLA to this Site Does Not
Implicate Sovereign Immunity Under the Eleventh
Amendment.
1. Sovereign immunity only attaches in suits brought
against a state or state agency by a citizen of
either the United States or a foreign state.
Under the Eleventh Amendment, federal judicial power
excludes only suits "against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any For-
eign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh
Amendment does not bar federal jurisdiction over suits
brought (1) by one state against another, (2) by the United
States against a state, or (3) by one state agency against an-
other agency of the same state.
a. GUVS is not a state agency.
GUVS is a non-profit corporation governed by a Board of
Directors responsible for its own selection and replacement
and for its by-laws and all other matters of governance, sub-
ject only to the same laws applicable to other non-profit cor-
porations incorporated in New Union. (R. at 4).
Furthermore, a 1964 opinion of the New Union Attorney Gen-
eral concluded that "GUVS is not an instrumentality of New
Union state government." (R. at 4). Contrary to GUVS con-
tention, the Supreme Court did not hold that state chartered
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entities are to be treated the same as traditional state agen-
cies under the Eleventh Amendment in Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). GUVS is therefore not
entitled to sovereign immunity.
b. SNUHSA is not a citizen, it is a state agency.
Even if this court were to hold that GUVS is a state en-
tity entitled to sovereign immunity, immunity would not at-
tach in this case because SNUHSA is a state agency. The
Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal jurisdiction over
suits brought by one state entity against another entity of the
same state.
C. The Application of CERCLA § 107 to this Site Is Not
Retroactive Because Hazardous Waste Continued to
Be Released After CERCLA's Enactment.
CERCLA took effect on December 11, 1980. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(22). In part, CERCLA provides for liability for "costs
of removal or remedial action incurred," 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(A), and "any other necessary" response costs,
§ 9607(a)(4)(B). The medical monitoring costs at issue in this
case were not incurred until 1994. (R. at 6). Since all costs
were incurred after CERCLA's enactment, there is no need to
apply CERCLA retroactively in this case. See United States
v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp.
984, 996 (D.S.C. 1984), affd in part and vac. in part sub nom.
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
In Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994),
the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a statute does not operate
retroactively simply because it is applied to conduct antedat-
ing the statute's enactment. Id. at 1499 (citing Republic
Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 554, 556-57
(1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)); see also Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 435 (1992) (a
statute "is not made retroactive merely because it draws
upon antecedent facts for its operation"). Landgraf held that
a statute does have a retroactive effect when "it would impair
the rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's
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liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect
to transactions already completed." 114 S. Ct. at 1505.
CERCLA did not criminalize the past release of hazard-
ous substances, and even before CERCLA there was potential
liability for such releases under common law negligence.
Although CERCLA was designed to more effectively deal
with hazardous waste sites, it did not impair the rights
GUVS had when it dumped hazardous chemicals at 123 Lau-
rel Street, increase GUVS's liability for those releases, or im-
pose new duties on GUVS with respect to those releases.
Thus, the application of CERCLA to the pre-enactment re-
leases of hazardous wastes in this case is not retroactive
under the Supreme Court's analysis. Cf Chicago & A. R.R. v.
Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 73, 76 (1915) (a statute requiring a
bridge culvert did not apply retroactively to a railroad which
built a bridge without a culvert three months before the stat-
ute was enacted; the railroad was subject to liability because
"after that time [enactment of the statute] it maintained the
embankment in a manner prohibited"); City of Bakersfield v.
Miller, 410 P.2d 393, 399, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 988 (1966)
(building that was constructed in accordance with existing
building codes ordered modified pursuant to revised code
which was enacted "to eliminate presently existing public
danger").
D. Even If the Application of CERCLA § 107 to this Site
Were Retroactive, Such Retroactive Application
Would Be Constitutionally Permissible.
1. Under applicable Supreme Court analysis, a statute
applies retroactively if there is evidence of a
clear congressional intent that it do so.
The Supreme Court set forth the proper approach for de-
termining the retroactive effect of a statute in Landgraf. 114
S. Ct. at 1505. Where Congress does not expressly prescribe
a statute's proper reach, the statute governs retroactively if
there is "clear congressional intent favoring such a result."
Id. Since Congress did not expressly state that CERCLA is
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retroactive, this court must determine if there is evidence of a
clear congressional intent to apply CERCLA retroactively.
2. There is evidence of a clear congressional intent to
apply CERCLA retroactively.
Since Landgraf, several federal courts have been
presented with the question of CERCLA retroactivity.
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 96 F.3d 1434 (3d
Cir. 1996); Nevada ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. United States,
925 F. Supp. 691 (D. Nev. 1996); United States v. Olin, 927
F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996); Gould Inc. v. A & M Battery
& Tire Serv., 933 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Pa. 1996). Of these
courts, all but Olin have held that CERCLA does apply retro-
actively. Alcan, 96 F.3d at 1434; Nevada, 925 F. Supp. at
696; Gould, 933 F. Supp. at 438. Contra Olin, 927 F. Supp. at
1519 . Nevada concluded that there was clear evidence of a
congressional intent to apply CERCLA retroactively. 925 F.
Supp. at 695. CERCLA's retroactive effect had also been up-
held by numerous courts which had addressed the issue of
congressional intent prior to Landgraf E.g., United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co. [hereinafter
"NEPACCO"], 810 F.2d 726, 733, 737 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605
F. Supp. 1064, 1079 (D. Colo. 1985); City of Philadelphia v.
Stepan Chemical Co., 748 F. Supp. 283, 287-88 (E.D. Pa.
1990); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgoeff, 562 F. Supp. 1300,
1314 (N.D. Ohio 1983). Furthermore, earlier this year the
Supreme Court observed that "the 'two... main purposes of
CERCLA' are 'prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and
imposition of all cleanup costs on the responsible party."'
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1254 (1996)
(quoting General Electric Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation
Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (C.A. 8 1990)). Notably, the
California appellate decision the Supreme Court chose to
quote is one that applied CERCLA to costs incurred in 1985
in response to hazardous wastes released between 1959 and
1962. General Electric, 920 F.2d at 1416.
In Landgraf, the Supreme Court identified both a stat-
ute's text and its legislative history as factors to consider in
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evaluating the evidence of a clear congressional intent to ap-
ply a statute retroactively. 114 S. Ct. at 1493, 1496. CER-
CLA's text and legislative history reveal a clear congressional
intent to apply CERCLA retroactively.
a. CERCLA's text reveals a clear congressional
intent to apply CERCLA retroactively.
i) Negative inference analysis of CERCLA's text
reveals a clear congressional intent to apply
CERCLA retroactively.
CERCLA's civil liability section, § 107, sets forth three
distinct forms of liability: (1) "costs of removal or remedial
action," 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A); (2) "any other necessary"
response costs, § 9607(a)(4)(B); and (3) natural resource dam-
ages, § 9607(a)(4)(C). (Appendix A1-A2). Section 107(a) is si-
lent on the matter of retroactivity. However, two sections
closely related to the natural resource damages provision do
speak to the issue. Under § 107(f), persons may be held liable
for natural resource damages only "where such damages and
the release of a hazardous substance from which such dam-
ages resulted have occurred wholly before December 11,
1980." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1). Relatedly, under § 111(d), no
money from the established "Superfund" may be used where
the natural resource damage and "the release of a hazardous
substance from which such damage[ I resulted have occurred
wholly before December 11, 1980." 42 U.S.C. § 9611(d)(1).
Section 111(d)'s limitations on expenditures from the
Superfund for pre-enactment damages and releases specifi-
cally applies only to purposes listed in § 111(b) and
§§ 111(c)(1) and (2). Id.
As reasoned in cases like NEPACCO, Nevada, and Shell
Oil, the presence of the two "prospective only" provisions indi-
cates that other key CERCLA provisions should be construed
to apply both prospectively and retrospectively.NEPACCO,
810 F.2d at 736; Nevada, 925 F. Supp. at 693-94; Shell Oil,
605 F. Supp. at 1076. Had Congress similarly intended to
limit recovery of pre-enactment costs, it would have done so
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explicitly. Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1079. In that regard,
Shell Oil concluded:
If the presumption against retroactivity were sufficient to
preclude recovery for pre-enactment response costs, it
would also be sufficient to preclude recovery for pre-enact-
ment damages to natural resources. Obviously that was
not intended. If it were, the limiting provisions of sections
107(f) and 111(d) would be mere surplusage. In order to
give meaning to these provisions, one must assume that
liability for other damages-cost of removal or remedial ac-
tion incurred by ... any other person (§ 107(a)(4)(B))-is
not so limited.
605 F. Supp. at 1076.
Although the Supreme Court in Landgraf did not accept
the negative inference argument put forth for the Civil Rights
Act, it did not preclude the use of negative inference analysis
in support of retroactive intent for other statutes. The nega-
tive implication in CERCLA is much more persuasive than
that of the Civil Rights Act at issue in Landgraf. In Lan-
dgraf, the three "prospective only" provisions on which peti-
tioner relied were §§ 402(a), 402(b), and 109(c). 114 S. Ct. at
1493. Section 402(a) was the Act's effective date provision.
Section 402(b) was written to exempt a single disparate im-
pact case against the Wards Cove Packing Company. Id. Fi-
nally, § 109(c) addressed only the application of amendments
to that section of the Act which extended Title VII to overseas
employers. Id.
The Supreme Court held that § 402(a), standing alone,
was not probative of legislative intent. 114 S. Ct. at 1493.
The Court also held that in light of the tangential roles
§§ 402(b) and 109(c) played within the Act's statutory
scheme, the petitioner was placing "extraordinary weight on
two comparatively minor and narrow provisions in a long and
complex statute." Id.
In contrast, "the sections of CERCLA which create liabil-
ity for response costs on the one hand, and damage to natural
resources on the other, are hardly 'minor and narrow provi-
sions.'" Nevada ex rel., 925 F. Supp. at 701 (quoting Lan-
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dgraf, 114 S.Ct. at 1493)). The role which these sections play
in CERCLA-the very core of the Act's liability scheme-
stands in sharp contrast to the tangential role which the Civil
Rights Act's three "prospective only" provisions played in its
overall statutory scheme. Id. at 701-702.
The analysis employed in cases like Nevada and Shell
Oil remains a permissible approach after Landgraf. Both
courts applied the presumption against retroactivity, in ac-
cord with Landgraf, and held that it was outweighed by the
evidence of clear congressional intent for CERCLA retroactiv-
ity. See Nevada, 925 F. Supp at 698, 702-704; Shell Oil, 605
F. Supp .at 1069, 1076-77.
ii) CERCLA's use of the past tense reveals a clear
congressional intent to apply CERCLA
retroactively.
Section 107 of CERCLA speaks in the past tense. It
states that "any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which
such hazardous substances were disposed of," and "any per-
son who.., arranged for disposal... at any facility.., shall
be liable .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(4) (em-
phasis added). (Appendix A1-A2). The use of the past tense
suggests that Congress intended for CERCLA liability to
reach back before the enactment date. On its face, this lan-
guage refers to the time of disposal and does not place a tem-
poral limit on its scope. This evinces Congress' intent to
apply CERCLA retroactively.
iii) The prospective language of the CERCLA's
effective date provision does not negate the
clear congressional intent to apply
CERCLA retroactively.
CERCLA's effective date clause, § 302(a), reads: "Unless
otherwise provided, all provisions of this Act shall be effective
on December 11, 1980." 42 U.S.C. § 9652(a). However, an ef-
fective date clause, without more, does not speak to the issue
of retroactivity for every section of a statute. See Landgraf,
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/14
MOOT COURT
114 U.S. at 1505. In this case, the standard effective date
provision cannot "seriously be considered to negate CER-
CLA's overriding statutory scheme of retroactive liability."
Nevada ex rel., 925 F. Supp. at 695 (quoting Shell Oil, 605 F.
Supp. at 1075).
b. CERCLA's legislative history reveals a clear
congressional intent to apply CERCLA
retroactively.
In addition to the textual analysis set forth in part B(1)
above, CERCLA's legislative history further evinces Con-
gress' intent to apply CERCLA retroactively. "CERCLA was
a response to the perceived deficiencies and inadequacies of
existing federal environmental protection law, particularly
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ('RCRA'), Pub.
L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795, codified as an amendment to the
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901, et seq." Nevada
ex rel., 925 F. Supp. at 703 (citing Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at
1070-72; United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 792-93
(E.D. Pa. 1982); Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of Individu-
als Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 579, 603 n. 94 (1993)). One of the problems Con-
gress identified in RCRA was that it applied prospectively
only:
(c) Deficiencies in RCRA have left important gaps.
(1) The Act is prospective and applies to past sites only to
the extent they are posing an imminent hazard ..... It is
the intent of Committee in this legislation to initiate and
establish a comprehensive response and financing mecha-
nism to abate and control the vast problems associated
with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal
sites.
H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125. The use of the phrase
"abandoned and inactive" is an unequivocal reference to
dumping that had occurred prior to CERCLA's enactment,
and therefore compels retroactive application of CERCLA lia-
bility. The Report also referenced several notorious inactive
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sites, including Love Canal, and iterated Congress' concern
as to the cleanup costs associated with such sites. Id. at
6121-6122.
The Senate Report characterized CERCLA's liability
scheme as one designed to assure "that those responsible for
any damage, environmental harm, or injury from chemical
poisons bear the costs of their actions." S. Rep. No. 848, 96th
Cong. 2d Sess. 13 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119. The same report further explained:
[S]ociety should not bear the costs of protecting the public
from hazards produced in the past by a generator, trans-
porter, consumer, or dumpsite owner or operator who has
profited or otherwise benefitted from commerce involving
those substances and now wishes to be insulated from any
continuing responsibilities for the present hazards to soci-
ety that have been created.
Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
CERCLA's legislative history therefore reveals that (1)
Congress passed CERCLA, in part, to deal with pre-existing
inactive sites like Love Canal, and (2) that CERCLA was in-
tended to impose liability on the parties responsible for such
inactive sites. To effectuate this result, CERCLA must be ap-
plied retroactively. To find otherwise would frustrate a pri-
mary purpose of the Act.
REPLY POINT 2: THE DISTRICT COURT WAS
CORRECT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING
THAT CERCLA § 107 DOES PROVIDE FOR
LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL MONITORING
COSTS.
A. CERCLA Allows States to Recover All Removal or
Remedial Action Costs.
CERCLA § 107 (a)(4)(A) allows states to recover "all costs
of removal or remedial action incurred ... not inconsistent
with the national contingency plan." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988) (Appendix A2). "Remove" and "re-
moval" are defined to include the physical removal or cleanup
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of released hazardous substances as well as actions "neces-
sary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of
release of hazardous substances" and to "prevent, minimize
or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the
environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988) (Appendix Al).
"Remedy" and "remedial action" include "any monitoring rea-
sonably required to assure that [other remedial actions such
as dredging, for example] protect the public health and wel-
fare and the environment" and "those actions consistent with
permanent remedy taken." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988) (Ap-
pendix Al). See also, Susan L. Martin and Jonathan D. Mar-
tin, Tort Actions for Medical Monitoring: Warranted or
Wasteful?, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 121, 133 (1995).
CERCLA § 107 imposes liability for such removal or re-
medial costs on four categories of potentially responsible per-
sons ("PRPs"); among these categories are current owners or
operators of the facility where the substance was released,
such as WUWPS, and parties who owned or operated the fa-
cility when substances were released, such as GUVS. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988) (Appendix A1-A2). See also In re
Hemingway Transport, Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 921 (1st Cir. 1993).
The parties in this case have stipulated that SNUHSA's ac-
tions are consistent with the national contingency plan. (R.
at 7). Thus, the sole remaining issue is whether SNUHSA's
medical monitoring costs constitute "removal or remedial ac-
tion" costs. These terms are defined in CERCLA § 101(23)
and (24). 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (23) - (24) (1988) (Appendix Al).
B. Including Medical Monitoring Costs as Removal or
Remedial Costs Advances CERCLA's Objectives.
CERCLA was enacted in 1980 to address the ever-in-
creasing danger to public health resulting from past and
present dumping and improper storage of hazardous wastes.
See A&P S. Rep. 96-848. See also Exxon Corp v. Hunt, 475
U.S. 355, 358-60 (1986); Steven F. Baicker-McKee and James
M. Singer, Narrowing the Road of Private Cost Recovery: Re-
cent Developments Limiting Recovery of Private Response
Costs under CERCLA § 107, 25 ENvrL. L. REP. 10593, 10595
(1995). CERCLA protects public health in part by encourag-
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ing prompt response to and clean-up of hazardous waste con-
tamination. In re Hemingway, 993 F.2d at 921; B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2nd Cir. 1992).
See also Anthony R. Laratta and Brian S. Paszament, Diag-
nosing Medical Monitoring Costs Under CERCLA: Checking
for a Pulse, 7 VILL. EN TL. L. J. 81, 83 (1996). Allowing recov-
ery of the costs of medical monitoring, which may be neces-
sary to determine both the extent of the contamination and
the effectiveness of the response action, advances these poli-
cies by holding polluters liable for the response costs incurred
as a result of their conduct. Imposing the costs of medical
monitoring on polluters also creates an incentive for polluters
to engage in proper disposal activities. See Amy B. Blumen-
berg, Note, Medical Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment
of Future Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure
Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 681 (1992). Awarding these
costs also allows for the monitoring of persons exposed to haz-
ardous substances who would otherwise be unable to afford
monitoring, like the Marina family. (R. at 6). Medical moni-
toring provides valuable information about the health conse-
quences of such exposure. Blumenberg at 678-82. Therefore,
SNUHSA should be allowed to recover the costs of its medical
monitoring of the Marina family from the PRPs, GUVS and
WUWPS. To disallow the recovery of medical monitoring
costs would impede CERCLA's express purpose of protecting
human health and welfare. See Colin Crawford, Strategies
for Environmental Justice: Rethinking CERCLA Medical
Monitoring Lawsuits, 74 B.U. L. REV. 267, 304 (1994).
Medical monitoring and surveillance costs do not include
a recovery for personal injury resulting from the polluter's
conduct; rather, they play a part in CERCLA cleanup activi-
ties. Id. at 305-306. SNUHSA is seeking only medical moni-
toring and surveillance costs, which advances CERCLA's goal
of imposing response costs incurred to protect public health
on the polluters.
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C. Federal Courts Have Held that Medical Monitoring
Costs Are Recoverable as Removal or Remedial
Costs.
The district court in Brewer v. Raven, 680 F. Supp. 1176
(M.D. Tenn. 1988) was the first to recognize the distinction
between medical monitoring costs and costs associated with
reimbursement for personal injury. Brewer involved a class
action suit filed under CERCLA against a capacitor manufac-
turer by former employees. See Crawford at 322 (citing
Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1178). Although the court found that
medical expenses incurred in the treatment of personal inju-
ries or disease were not recoverable, the court refused to
grant a summary judgment denying recovery of plaintiffs
medical monitoring costs because it found that the screening
and testing in question was "conducted to assess the effect of
the release or discharge on the public health or to identify
potential public health problems." Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at
11789. The court concluded that such medical monitoring
procedures were necessary to "monitor, asses [or] evaluate a
release" and therefore qualified as "removal" under CERCLA
§ 101(23). Id. The court's reasoning turned on its distinction
between costs incurred in the determination of the effects of
the exposure and costs incurred in treating any illness caused
by the exposure-the former was recoverable, the latter was
not. Id.
Similarly, in Lykins v. Westinghouse Electric, 1988 WL
114522 (E.D. Ky. 1988), the defendants' motion for summary
judgment against the plaintiffs' claim for medical monitoring
costs was also defeated. The court concluded that costs that
are part of a "response to a hazardous waste problem" are
recoverable, while costs that are part of a private claim for
damages are not. See Laratta and Paszament at 94, citing
Lykins, at *3.
In Williams v. Allied Automotive, Autolite Div., 704 F.
Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1988), the Northern District of Ohio
also refused to grant summary judgment against plaintiff's
claim for medical monitoring costs under CERCLA, finding
that "c]osts of medical testing ... are recoverable response
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costs under CERCLA." 704 F. Supp. at 784 (citing Brewer,
680 F. Supp .at 1179). The court concluded that medical
monitoring costs are "not categorically unrecoverable as re-
sponse costs under CERCLA," as long the costs are incurred
in a manner consistent with the NCP. Id.
As discussed above, SNUHSA is not required to show
that its medical monitoring costs were "necessary" under
CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), and the parties have stipulated that
the costs were incurred in a manner consistent with the na-
tional contingency plan. (R. at 6). SNUHSA's costs, like the
plaintiffs' costs in these cases, are valid CERCLA response
costs. SNUHSA is not attempting to recover personal injury
costs; rather, the Marina's testing is necessary to assess the
long term effects of their exposure to the toxic photo-process-
ing chemicals.
D. Those Federal Courts That Have Not Included Medical
Monitoring Costs as Removal or Remedial Costs
Relied on a Single District Court's Faulty
Reasoning.
Due to the ambiguous phrasing of CERCLA § 107
(a)(4)(B), and the lack of a definition for the term "necessary
response costs," the district courts have struggled with deter-
mining whether a private party may recover medical moni-
toring costs under that section. Williams, 704 F. Supp. at 785
(citing Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179). SNUHSA, however, is
not a private party and is seeking to recover its medical moni-
toring costs under CERCLA § 107 (a)(4)(A). (R. at 7) While
this avoids the confusion with respect to the term "necessary
response costs", the issue remains as to whether its costs
qualify as are recoverable "removal or remedial" costs under
CERCLA § 101(23) or (24). Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp.,
1988 WL 120739 (E.D. Pa. 1988), epitomizes the line of fed-
eral court decisions finding medical monitoring costs not re-
coverable under CERCLA. Coburn's reasoning is flawed in
several respects, however. First, the court relies heavily on
CERCLA's legislative history even though it notes that the
legislative history is nearly as far from lucid as the statute
itself, specifically citing the Third Circuit's statement that
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"[t]he legislative history [of CERCLA] furnishes at best a
sparse and unreliable guide to the statute's meaning."
Coburn, 1988 WL at *3 (citing Artesian Water Co. v. New Cas-
tle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3rd Cir. 1988)). See also Kris-
tin Elizabeth Sweeney, Recent Development, Daigle v. Shell
Oil Company and the Bumpy Road to the Recoverability of
Medical Monitoring Expenses under CERCLA, 47 Vand. L.
Rev. 235, 254 (1994).
Coburn also erroneously relied on the creation of the
Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry ("ATSDR")
under CERCLA and its subsequent expansion under the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
("SARA"). Coburn, 1988 WL at *3. Coburn and its progeny
point to the creation of the ATSDR as evidence that Congress
"was not ignorant of the potential need for medical testing
arising out of a release of toxic substances" and chose to pro-
vide for those needs under § 104(i) of CERCLA rather than
§ 107. Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 904 (D.
Minn. 1990). See also Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F.
Supp. 692, 713-14 (D. Kan. 1991); Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750
F. Supp. 1233, 1249 (M.D. Pa. 1991); Romeo v. General Chem-
ical Corp., 922 F. Supp. 287, 291 (N.D. Calif. 1994).
The ATSDR is charged with compiling a national regis-
try of toxic substance contamination, tracking scientific liter-
ature discussing toxic substances and providing emergency
medical care and testing to people exposed to hazardous sub-
stances. SARA added the requirement that the ATSDR per-
form research on the effects of toxic exposure on human
health. The ATSDR, however, is only effective for sites that
have been listed on the NPL. It is limited, by the terms of its
creating legislation, to those extremely contaminated sites,
which leaves smaller, less severely contaminated site uncov-
ered. See Kathryn E. Hand, Comment, Someone to Watch
Over Me: Medical Monitoring Costs Under CERCLA, 21 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 363, 371-72. Additionally, performing
long term medical monitoring is not the ATSDR's focus;
rather, it performs medical monitoring when "a significant in-
creased risk of adverse health effects in humans" is found. Id.
citing 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(9)(1988). The ATSDR is designed
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"primarily for information gathering," not to provide medical
monitoring on a more individualized basis, as is needed at
smaller contaminated sites, such as the one involved in this
case. Id. at 373.
Finally, in drawing its conclusion that medical monitor-
ing costs are not recoverable, the Coburn court stated "we
find it difficult to understand how future medical testing and
monitoring of persons who were exposed to contaminated
well water ... will do anything to 'monitor, assess, [or] evalu-
ate a release' of contamination from the site." Coburn, 1988
WL at *6. This statement is erroneous is several respects.
First, it incorrectly concludes that hazardous materials are
never released during the remediation process; such possible
releases make continued medical monitoring part of the
remediation process. See Crawford at 308. The conclusion
also disregards CERCLA's objective of protecting public
health, focusing solely on cleaning up the environment with-
out considering the needs of the people exposed to the hazard-
ous substance. Id. The Coburn court also failed to recognize
that CERCLA remediation is a long-term process, refusing to
recognize that medical monitoring is a long-term response to
the release of hazardous substances, made necessary by the
latent effects of many of these materials. Id. at 308-309.
The Tenth Circuit was the first Circuit Court to consider
the recoverability of medical monitoring costs under CER-
CLA. In its opinion, the court endorsed and paralleled
Coburn's "comprehensive analysis". Daigle v. Shell Oil Co.,
972 F.2d 1527, 1535 (10th Cir. 1992). See also Crawford at
309. The Daigle court also relied on the absence of medical
monitoring in the list of specific examples of "removal costs."
972 F.2d at 1535. CERCLA, however, is designed to "have a
broad sweep with respect to protection of public health ... or
the environment," and the list of examples of what consti-
tutes a removal action is specifically nonexclusive. Crawford
at 310. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988) (Appendix Al).
The Daigle court's reliance on CERCLA's legislative history
and the creation of the ATSDR is as misplaced as the analysis
of the Coburn court. Subsequent district court decisions have
followed Daigle with little or no analysis. See, e.g., Romeo,
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922 F. Supp. at 290-91; Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 845 F.
Supp. 705 (D. Ariz. 1993).
The Ninth Circuit considered the recoverability of medi-
cal monitoring costs under CERCLA in Price v. United States
Navy, 39 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1994). It also deferred to Dai-
gle's analysis. Id. at 1017. Upon revisiting the issue in Dur-
fey v. E.I DuPont de Nemours & Co., 59 F.3d 121 (9th Cir.
1995), the Ninth Circuit noted that the ATSDR "... . has yet to
undertake any medical monitoring activities anywhere in the
country." Id. n5. This strengthens the argument that the
ATSDR is not a sufficient provider of medical surveillance
and that the Coburn and Daigle courts' reliance on its crea-
tion as an alternate means of meeting the public's testing
needs is erroneous.
POINT OF ERROR 1: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED
AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT
WUWPS, A POTENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE
PARTY, HAS THE CHOICE OF PROCEEDING
UNDER EITHER CERCLA 107 OR CERCLA 113(f) IN
ITS CONTRIBUTION CLAIM AGAINST GUVS.
CERCLA's original provisions did not specifically allow
for contribution actions for parties that incurred response
costs; parties were limited to cost recovery actions under
§ 107. See William D. Buckley, Jr., Making a Case for Statu-
tory Amendment to the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"): Solving
the Section 107/Section 113 Cause of Action Controversy, 31
TULSA L.J. 851, 856 (1996). Courts, however, recognized an
implied right of contribution under §107. Id.
In 1986, Congress expressly articulated the implied right
to contribution under CERCLA through an amendment to
§ 113 in SARA. United States v. Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d
1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995). Congress' purpose in creating
this express right to contribution was to "clarifly] and con-
firm[ I the right of a person held jointly and severally liable
under CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially
liable parties, when the person believes that it has assumed a
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share of the cleanup or cost that may be greater than its equi-
table share under the circumstances." A&P S. Rep. 99-11
(1985).
A. Limiting Contribution Claims to § 113(f) Comport with
CERCLA's Statutory Objectives.
As discussed earlier, one of the basic objectives of CER-
CLA is to encourage prompt response to and cleanup of haz-
ardous waste contamination. CERCLA §113(f)(2) provides
the government with a means to encourage "timely" settle-
ments, thereby avoiding protracted litigation. United Tech-
nologies v. Browning Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 102-103
(1st Cir. 1994). See also 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (1988) (Appen-
dix A2). Parties that settle with the government "shall not be
liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed
in the settlement." United Technologies, 33 F.3d at 103. If
PRPs were allowed to recover for contribution under §107,
§113(f)(2)'s protection for settling parties would "afford very
little protection" and therefore would greatly "greatly dimin-
ish the incentive for parties to reach early settlements with
the government, thereby thwarting Congress' discernible in-
tent." Id. Other courts have also recognized the danger
posed to §113(f)(2)'s protections by allowing contribution ac-
tions under §107. See Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30
F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding defendant's settlement
with government precluded plaintiffs §107 claim and noting
that the plaintiff was "seeking to apportion liability for an in-
jury to which it contributed"); Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d at
1536 (court refused claims filed under §107 against parties
that had previously settled with the government). See also
Baicker-McKee and Singer.
CERCLA also insures prompt remedial and removal ac-
tions by specifying a statute of limitations for actions brought
to recover removal and remedial expenditures. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9613(g)(2), (3) (1988) (Appendix A2-A3). Section
113(g)(3)(B) provides that the three year statute of limitation
for a contribution claim starts to run when a "judicially ap-
proved settlement' is entered. Id. See also United Technolo-
gies, 33 F.3d at 98. Allowing PRPs to seek contribution under
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§107 rather than §113 will unnecessarily protract the
cleanup process, thereby contravening CERCLA's objective of
encouraging prompt resolution of and response to contamina-
tion. In Untied Technologies, the court struck down a §107
claim that was an attempt to circumvent §113's shorter stat-
ute of limitations. Id. at 103.
B. Current Case Law Demonstrates a Trend Among the
Federal Courts Recognizing That PRPs Can Only
Seek Contribution Through §113(f).
In the first few years following the enactment of SARA
and the codification of the right to contribution, courts contin-
ued to recognize contribution claims advanced by PRPs under
§ 107. See Baicker-McKee and Singer. Recently, however,
circuit courts have increasingly found that PRPs are limited
to §113(f). See Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d at 1539; United
Technologies, Inc., 33 F.3d at 103; Akzo Coatings, 30 F.3d at
764-65. But see Velsicol Chemical Corp v. Enenco, Inc., 9 F.3d
524 (6th Cir. 1993); In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 951 F.2d 246
(9th Cir. 1991). While Velsicol and In re Dant may arguably
allow for recovery under either §107 or §113(f), neither case
"squarely address[es] this issue." See, William D. Evans, Jr.,
The "Road Warrior" Quality of Superfund Contribution Liti-
gation, 32-AUG TENN. B.J. 26, 30 (1996). In fact, a district
court within the Ninth Circuit held that a PRP may only
bring a recovery action under §113(f) after the Velsicol deci-
sion was handed down. See Kaufman & Broad-South Bay v.
Unisys Corp., 868 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
1. The First Circuit looked to the plain legal meaning
of "contribution" and found a PRP could only
seek contribution under § 113(f).
United Technologies involved a question as to whether a
PRP must bring a contribution action within three years as
required by §113(f), or whether it could sue for contribution
under §107, which allows for six years to bring a claim. 33
F.3d at 98. In finding that a PRP is limited to §113(f) in seek-
ing contribution, the court looked to the generally accepted
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legal meaning of the word "contribution." Id. at 99, 103. The
court relied on Akzo Coatings' definition of a contribution
claim as a claim "by and between jointly and severally liable
parties for an appropriate division of the payment one of
them has been compelled to make." Id. at 99 (citing 30 F.3d
at 764).
United Technologies recognized that "CERCLA's text in-
dicates that contribution and cost recovery actions are dis-
tinct, non-overlapping anodynes," with separate periods of
limitations. Id. at 103. Therefore, the Supreme Court's dicta
in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 1960, 1966
(1994) is distinguishable. Id. at 103, n.12. The Supreme
Court stated that CERCLA ".... authorizes a cause of action
for contribution in §113 and impliedly authorizes a similar
and somewhat overlapping remedy in §107." Key Tronic, 114
S.Ct. at 1966. However, this statement is consistent with
United Technologies' holding since the Supreme Court "was
discussing two different species of contribution actions and
expressed no views [about] the relation between contribution
and cost recovery actions." 33 F.3d at 103, n.12.
Recent district court decisions have followed United
Technologies' "113(f)-Only" rule with respect to PRPs. See
Sun Co., Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Inc., 919 F. Supp. 1523,
1528 (N.D. Okla. 1996); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Arkansas
Power & Light Co., 920 F. Supp. 991, 995 (E.D. Ark. 1996);
Dartron Corp. v. Uniroyal Chemical Co., Inc., 917 F. Supp.
1173, 1182 (N.D. Ohio 1996). In the present case, WUWPS,
as the present owner of the contaminated site, is a PRP under
CERCLA §107 and is therefore jointly and severally liable
with GUVS, from whom it seeks cost recovery. (R. at 7)
Under the United Technologies definition of "contribution",
WUWPS must therefore seek recovery under §113(f).
2. Recent Federal Court decisions find PRPs, by virtue
of their PRP status, are limited to bringing
contribution claims under § 113(f) only.
In United Technologies, the First Circuit noted in pass-
ing that it is possible that a PRP who voluntarily initiates
cleanup proceedings, rather than being compelled to take ac-
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tion, may be able to pursue "an implied right of action for con-
tribution under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)." 33 F.3d at 99, n.8. The
Tenth Circuit, however, in its subsequent Colorado & E. R.R.
decision, ruled that a PRP, since it is a PRP, must bring a
contribution action under §113(f). "There is no disagreement
that both parties are PRPs by virtue of their past or present
ownership of the site; therefore, any claim that would reap-
portion costs between these parties is the quintessential
claim for contribution." Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d at 1536.
The court also cited the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Amoco
Oil Co. v. Borden Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989), which
held that "[w]hen one liable party sues another to recover its
equitable share of the response costs, the action is one for
contribution." Id. at 672. The court essentially held that cost
recovery claims must be pursued under §107 and contribu-
tion claims must be brought under §113. Id.
In Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516 (D.
Utah 1995), the district court followed Colorado & E. R.R.'s
reasoning. The plaintiff in Ekotek had "voluntarily" assisted
in cleanup operations and incurred response costs in the pro-
cess, and therefore argued that it was distinguishable from
the plaintiffs involved in Colorado & E. R.R. 881 F. Supp. at
1521. The court, however, ruled that the "plaintiffs status as
a PRP, and not the degree of voluntariness with which it ini-
tiated cleanup activity" was compelling, and limited the
plaintiff to a contribution claim under CERCLA §113.
CONCLUSION
For all of these reasons, the State of New Union Health
Services Agency respectfully requests that this court affirm
the District Court for the District of New Union's holding]
that CERCLA is applicable to 123 Laurel Street and does pro-
vide for liability for medical monitoring costs, and prays for
all other relief to which it may show itself justly entitled. The
State of New Union Health Services Agency also respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the District Court for the
District of New Union's holding that CERCLA § 107 is avail-
able to a potentially responsible party and render judgment.
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APPENDIX
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 cl. 3
"To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes;"
U.S. Const. amend. XI.
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of an-
other State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988).
The terms "remove" or "removal" means the cleanup or re-
moval of released hazardous substances from the environ-
ment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of
the threat of release of hazardous substances into the envi-
ronment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, as-
sess, and evaluate the release or threat or release of
hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or
the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to pre-
vent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or
welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result
from a release or threat of release. The term includes, in ad-
dition, without being limited to, security fencing or other
measure to limit access, provision of alternative water sup-
plies, temporary evacuation and housing of threatened indi-
viduals not otherwise provided for, action taken under
section 0604(b) of this title, and any emergency assistance
which may be provided under the Disaster Relief and Emer-
gency Assistance Act [42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq.].
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988).
The terms "remedy" or "remedial action" means those actions
consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in ad-
dition to removal actions in the event of a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environ-
ment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous sub-
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stances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial
danger
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1-4) (1988).
(a) Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and damages;
interest rate "comparable maturity" date
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and
subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of
this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazard-
ous substance owned or operated any facility at which such
hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who
by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or pos-
sessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any
facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another
party or entity and containing such hazardous substances,
and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities,
incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, form
which thereis a release, or a threatened release which causes
the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance,
shall be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not
inconsistent with the national with the national contingency
plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natu-
ral resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing
such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release;
and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects
study carried out under section 9604(I) of this title.
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42 U.S.C. § 9613(0 (1988).
(1) Contribution
Any person may seek contribution from any other person
who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this
title, during or following any civil action under section 9606
of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims
shall be brought in accordance with this section and the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Fed-
eral law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may
allocate response costs among liable parties using such equi-
table factors as the court determines are appropriate. Noth-
ing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person
of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607
of this title.
(2) Settlement
A person who has resolved its liability to the United
States or a State in an administrative or judicially approved
settlement shall not be liable for claims for contribution re-
garding matter addressed in the settlement. Such settlement
does not discharge any of the other potentially liable persons
unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liabil-
ity of the others by the amount of the settlement.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)- (3) (1988).
(g) Period in which action may be brought:
(2) Actions for recovery of costs;
An initial action for recovery of the costs referred to in
section 9607 of this title must be commenced (A) for a re-
moval action, within 3 years after completion of the removal
action, except that such cost recovery action must be brought
within 6 years after a determination to grant a waiver under
section 9604(c)(1)(C) of this title for continued response ac-
tion; and
(B) for a remedial action, within 6 years after initiation of
physical on-site construction of the remedial action, except
that, if the remedial action is initiated within 3 years after
the completion of the removal action, costs incurred in the
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removal action may be recovered in the cost recovery action
brought under this subparagraph.
In any such action described in this subsection, the court
shall enter a declaratory judgment on liability for response
costs or damages that will be binding on any subsequent ac-
tion or actions to recover further response costs or damages.
A subsequent action or actions under section 9607 of this title
for further response costs at the vessel or facility may be
maintained at any time during the response action, but must
be commenced no later than 3 years after the date of comple-
tion of all response action. Except as otherwise provided in
this paragraph, an action may be commenced under section
9607 of this title for recovery of costs at any time after such
costs have been incurred.
(3) Contribution
No action for contribution for any response costs or dam-
ages may be commenced more than 3 years after-
(A) the date of judgment in any action under this chapter
for recovery of such costs or damages, or
(B) the date of an administrative order under section
9622(g) of this title (relating to de minimis settlements) or
9622(h) of this title (relating to cost recovery settlements) or
entry of a judicially approved settlement with respect to such
costs or damages.
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